UTA0178
No sourced public emblem in this profile.
reference profile · reported nexus: CN (not nationality)
While Volexity largely observed the attacker essentially living off the land, they still deployed a handful of malware files and tools during the course of the incident which primarily consisted of webshells, proxy utilities, and file modifications to allow credential harvesting. Once UTA0178 had access into the network via the ICS VPN appliance, their general approach was to pivot from system to system using compromised credentials. They would then further compromise credentials of users on any new system that was breached, and use these credentials to log into additional systems via RDP. Volexity observed the attacker obtaining credentials in a variety of ways.
Source-reported aliases: UNC5221, Red Dev 61, ARMORY CASTLE. Associations do not prove equivalence.
Target geography
Catalog-listed countries (associations, not attack counts): 
Germany
No bound claim-post feed for this label.
Historical casebook
No dated record curated yet; absence does not establish inactivity.
Planned Kinwilder coverage
Tentative editorial review windows, contingent on evidence and review; not promised publication dates or predictions of attacks.
No assigned review window.
References
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-targets-ivanti-zero-day
https://quointelligence.eu/2024/01/unc5221-unreported-and-undetected-wirefire-web-shell-variant/
https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/18/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-exploitation-new-observations/
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/investigating-ivanti-zero-day-exploitation
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust