GhostAction
No sourced public emblem in this profile.
reference profile · reported nexus: Unknown (not nationality)
Software supply chain campaign and its unnamed operator, first reported by GitGuardian in September 2025: malicious GitHub Actions workflows named "Github Actions Security" injected into compromised repositories exfiltrated CI/CD secrets, with 3,325 secrets stolen from 817 repositories. In October 2026 OpenSourceMalware reported a renewed wave and a second stage that no longer needs a CI runner: a .vscode/tasks.json launcher with a folderOpen trigger runs a Node.js credential stealer disguised as public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2, installs a cron job polling the operator's server, and is backed by a fallback workflow. OpenSourceMalware calls this stage a copycat of the DPRK PolinRider technique rather than an extension of it, and ties it to GhostAction through shared server infrastructure. A phishing kit on the lookalike domain my-github.com, harvesting credentials and silently authorizing an OAuth application with repo and workflow scopes, was reported on the same infrastructure.
Source-reported aliases: . Associations do not prove equivalence.
Target geography
Catalog-listed countries (associations, not attack counts): No country-level metadata
No bound claim-post feed for this label.
Historical casebook
No dated record curated yet; absence does not establish inactivity.
Planned Kinwilder coverage
Tentative editorial review windows, contingent on evidence and review; not promised publication dates or predictions of attacks.
No assigned review window.
References
https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-campaign-3-325-secrets-stolen/
https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/ghostaction-attackers-plant-credential.html